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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
After the district court denied his motion to suppress, a jury convicted David Nelson of
one count of possession of methamphetamine, and Mr. Nelson pled guilty to the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement. In denying Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress, the district court
agreed with the State that Mr. Nelson did not have standing to challenge the search by way of the
curtilage of his friend’s home, because Mr. Nelson had waived his rights to be free from
unconstitutional searches by initialing an Agreement of Supervision as part of his parole process.
On appeal, Mr. Nelson asserts that the State did not meet its burden of proving a valid agreement
of supervision was in effect when the unlawful search occurred, or that the search of the
apartment was permissible pursuant to Mr. Nelson’s consent to the Fourth Amendment waiver
provision. Further, Mr. Nelson was an overnight guest, and thus had an expectation of privacy in
the residence which was viewed unlawfully from the apartment’s curtilage. The remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation is suppression, and the district court should have suppressed the
evidence found in the home.
The district court also erred in denying Mr. Nelson’s motion for appointment of conflict
counsel, where the court failed to provide Mr. Nelson with a full and fair opportunity to explain
the problems he was having with his counsel so that the court could determine if the attorneyclient relationship was irretrievably broken.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contention that Mr. Nelson had no
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate. (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.)
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson’s motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Nelson’s motion for substitute counsel?1

1

This issue was thoroughly briefed in Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief and Mr. Nelson will rely
on the arguments made therein.
3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Nelson’s Motion To Suppress
The State claims that it was Mr. Nelson’s burden to establish a privacy right under Pruss:
“Once the state presented evidence that Nelson was on parole at the relevant time and that his
parole Agreement of Supervision included a search and seizure rights waiver, Nelson had the
burden of showing the search intruded upon his limited expectation of privacy.” (Respondent’s
Brief, p.7.) The State later contends Mr. Nelson “had no reasonable expectation of privacy”
because he was a parolee who had, as a condition of parole, a requirement that he submit to
searches. (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.) However, the State fails to acknowledge its full burden is
to show a reasonable search was conducted pursuant to the existence of a valid and effective
parole Agreement of Supervision with a search and seizure rights waiver to which Mr. Nelson
voluntarily and intelligently consented. This it failed to establish.
The language in the parole agreement purports to contract away Mr. Nelson’s fourth
amendment rights.

In exchange for parole, Mr. Nelson apparently agreed to seventeen

conditions, including the following waiver:
5. Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal
property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for
which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of IDOC or a law
enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and
the Idaho constitution concerning searches.
(State’s Exhibit 1.) Mr. Nelson testified that he had signed the Agreement on May 8, 2016,
before he was released from prison. (Tr., p.9, Ls.1-12.)
Mr. Nelson does not contest that a parolee may waive his Fourth Amendment rights by
executing a valid parole agreement that contains a Fourth Amendment waiver.

It is well

established that in such situations the State must show that the search was reasonable. See
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State v. Robinson, 152 Idaho 961, 964–65 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding the State must show a search
conducted pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver in a probation agreement is reasonable
“under all the circumstances”). However, in addition to showing the reasonableness of the
search, the State must also demonstrate consent was voluntary and intelligent.
Conditions of probation, especially a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right, cannot be
implied. State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496 (2006). As the Idaho Supreme Court held in
State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208 (2009), a parolee’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver
of his Fourth Amendment rights.
While the State is correct in its assertion that “the word ‘voluntary’ (and ‘knowing’ and
‘intelligent’) appear nowhere in the Samson decision” (Respondent’s Brief, p.12), Samson is
distinguishable in that the United States Supreme Court did not address the specific question of
whether a parole agreement executed by a parolee constitutes valid consent to support a complete
waiver of Fourth Amendment rights (See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n. 3 (2006)
(“Because we find that the search at issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth
Amendment approach, we need not reach the issue whether ‘acceptance of the search condition
constituted consent in the Schneckloth. . . sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment
rights.’” (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)))).2 Further, the Samson

2

In his dissent in Samson, Justice Stevens, who was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, found
the notion of parolee consent-to-search provisions to be “sophistry.” 547 U.S. at 863 n. 4,
(Stevens, J., dissenting)
[A prisoner] has no “choice” concerning the search condition; he may either
remain in prison, where he will be subjected to suspicionless searches, or he may
exit prison and still be subject to suspicionless searches. Accordingly, “to speak of
consent in this context is to resort to a ‘manifest fiction,’ for ‘the [parolee] who
purportedly waives his rights by accepting such a condition has little genuine
option to refuse.’ ”
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majority, in response to the dissent, noted that California case law prohibited parolee searches so
long as they were not “arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 847, 856.
While the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue, Idaho courts
do conduct this critical consent analysis. See State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 210 (2009)
(holding defendant consented to submit to random evidentiary testing and, therefore, he
impliedly consented to a limited seizure of his person necessary to effectuate such searches);
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841 (1987) (holding that a probation condition that requires a
probationer to submit to a search “at the request of” an officer requires the probationer to be
informed of an officer’s intent to conduct a search); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239 (Ct. App.
1985) (holding that the issue of voluntary knowing and intelligent waivers is essentially a factual
issue turning on the defendant’s state of mind, and lending itself to resolution by the trial court).
Like the concerns expressed by Justice Steven in his dissent in Samson, Idaho appellate
courts have also been preoccupied with the breadth and scope of waivers/consents set forth as a
term of parole or probation. Idaho law as to the lawfulness of searches of parolees has evolved
since the Idaho Court of Appeals decided State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227 (Ct. App. 1983), a case
in which the Court affirmed the district court’s order denying suppression, while noting:
While approving the search in this case, we note that intrusions upon a
probationer’s privacy which do not relate to proper administration of probation
are invalid. A search cannot be based upon a mere hunch without factual basis,
nor upon “casual rumor, general reputation, or mere whim.” State v. Simms,
supra 516 P.2d at 1096. Moreover, searches intended merely to harass or
intimidate probationers or parolees cannot be tolerated. Latta v. Fitzharris,
supra at 252.
Pinson, 104 Idaho at 233.

Id. (quoting 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment §
10.10(b), at 440–41 (4th ed. 2004)).
6

Since Pinson, the Idaho Supreme Court has decided Gawron and Purdum, in which the
Court analyzed whether the consent to search/waiver of Fourth Amendment rights was intelligent
and voluntary. In Gawron, while the Idaho Supreme Court majority examined whether the
defendant had shown his consent was unintelligent or involuntary, the dissent disagreed with the
majority’s focus. Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843. In his dissent, Justice Bistline analyzed the
voluntariness of a consent required as a condition of probation, and the problem with the broad,
unfettered language of some of those waivers:
[T]he condition imposed on Consuelo-Gonzalez literally permits searches which
could not possibly serve the ends of probation. For example, an intimidating and
harassing search to serve law enforcement ends totally unrelated to either her
prior conviction or her rehabilitation is authorized by the terms of the condition.
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 845 (quoting United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th
Cir. 1975)).
In his dissent in Gawron, Justice Bistline also expressed concern regarding the burden
such unbridled waivers cause to the family, roommates, or friends of probationers. He examined
a decision by the Montana Supreme Court, State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980), and
noted:
There is an overriding need to balance the rights of society against the
probationer’s and third parties’ expectation of privacy. The unlimited bounds of
Gawron’s probation condition could inevitably lead to an invasion of the privacy
of third parties associated with Gawron, be they family, relatives, or friends:
We can only assume a “respectable position” if we can give fair
consideration to the rights of innocent third parties who may be
caught up in the web of ‘the probationary system or probationary
process. These people are not stripped of their right of privacy
because they may be living with a probationer or he may be living
with them. While a probationer’s right of privacy may be
justifiably diminished while on probation, the rights of these
people are not so diminished. We, as well as the trial courts, would
be derelict in our duties if we failed to consider the rights of these
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innocent others so that they are not swept away by the
probationary process. Fogarty, supra, 610 P.2d at 151.
The majority’s language fails to give even the slightest consideration, nay, even
mention of, the effect Gawron’s probation conditions may have on innocent third
parties.
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho at 845–46.
In one of the more recent cases addressing a parole or probation waiver/consent, State v.
Turek, 150 Idaho 745 (Ct. App. 2011), the Court of Appeals distinguished the facts of Gawron
and Purdum to find found the language of the waiver did not authorize the search because it only
required the probationer to “submit to searches” “at the request of” a probation or law
enforcement officer. Turek, 150 Idaho at 752. The Court held that a probation condition that
requires a probationer to submit to a search “at the request of” an officer requires that the
probationer be informed that the officer intends to conduct a search. Id. The Turek Court noted:
[A] key component of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription of warrantless searches—the scope of the consent. It is well settled
that when the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the
limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent. The standard for
measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of objective
reasonableness.
Turek, 150 Idaho at 749 (internal citations omitted). The Court said, “we must keep in mind that
probationers’ expectation of privacy is merely diminished, not obliterated.” Turek, 150 Idaho at
752. It is clear from the language contained in these cases that the scope of the consent, whether
the consent was voluntarily and intelligently given, or even if a parolee or probationer can
consent when it is a choice between imprisonment or signing such a waiver/consent in order to
be able to enter or remain in the community.
Here, it is a huge leap to say that Mr. Nelson, in purportedly waiving his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures, or even by purportedly giving
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his consent to searches of areas in which he was “the controlling authority,” could have
anticipated that in doing so he would be authorizing an officer to peep into an apartment window
to watch the activities of Mr. Nelson and his female friend whilst in the bedroom of her
apartment. Such an invasion is far from reasonable and was entirely unrelated to Mr. Nelson’s
supervision on parole.

Clearly the concerns expressed in Idaho’s appellate courts were

legitimate and this case illustrates the means by which law enforcement may fully abuse a parole
waiver.
Here, the State did not introduce sufficient evidence to show Mr. Nelson entered into a
valid and enforceable consent/waiver agreement or that it completely and entirely waived his
rights to be free from unlawful searches. The State introduced a document which appears to be
an excerpt from Mr. Nelson’s parole agreement and which appears to contain a Fourth
Amendment waiver/consent to search areas for which Mr. Nelson was “the controlling authority”
(State’s Exhibit 1, pp.1-3); however, no probation and parole officer testified whether the
agreement Mr. Nelson said he signed was in effect on the date of the search, August 11, 2016.
Nor was there evidence of the conditions under which Mr. Nelson signed the agreement—
whether his agreement was voluntary and intelligent. Finally, the search of Mr. Nelson’s female
friend’s bedroom by the means used—an officer standing in an alleyway blocked off to the
public peering in the window of the apartment—was certainly not reasonable or related to
Mr. Nelson’s supervision on parole. The State has failed to demonstrate that Mr. Nelson’s
expectation of privacy was entirely obliterated such that he could not challenge the officer’s
conduct on August 11, 2016.

9

CONCLUSION
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and
order of commitment, reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress, and reverse the
order which denied his motion for substitute counsel and remand for a hearing.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2017.

_________/s/________________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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